1. 1546. A Liberator aircraft observed making a Depth Charge attack about 5 miles to the westwards of ESKIMO. A smoke marker was dropped and a further attack made with Depth Charges and Rocket Projectiles.

2. Position was 49o 01' N, 05o 34' W, and corresponds approximately to that given in Aircraft No.85's Enemy Report timed 241548.

3. Destroyers turned together and swept towards smoke marker in line abreast, reducing to 7 knots at about 2 miles from it.

4. 1615. ESKIMO obtained A/S contact at 700 yards. Though a good echo at first, it faded rapidly and was lost at 500 yards.

5. Opened the range, regained contact, and at 1626 attacked within position "G".

6. Subsequently, six further attacks were made by ESKIMO, the last at 1825.

7. Asdic conditions on the whole were exceptionally good, and little interference from non subs was experienced. The same cannot be said of the operating which was poor. The echo, when firmly in contact, was excellent, and was held out to 2400 yards on one occasion, but during the runs in it was lost once at 500 yards, at other times shorter ranges and sometimes held right in. The varying range of loosing contact would seem to indicate that the U-boat was changing depth, but in fact I think she remained on or near the bottom most of the time.

8. The U-boat moved but little during the whole 3 hours of the hunt, the position of surfacing being only 2 miles from the initial contact. This movement is much the same as the estimated tidal set. Doppler was not very marked at any time. I think the U-boat took avoiding action in a half hearted way sometimes, but never violent and bold action.

9. His policy was to remain bottomed, drifting with the tide and hoping for the best, quite a wise policy perhaps had he not been SIGHTED by aircraft, and his presence confirmed thereby, but stupid in the circumstances, especially when he must have realised that we were keeping contact. His apparent lack of movement certainly did look suspicious, and towards the end some doubt was beginning to creep into our minds. The echo, however, was such a cracking good one, that the doubts were effectively counteracted.

10. On a few occasions false echoes were obtained, and sometimes two or three at the same time. A few SBT may have been ejected and the U-boat may have moved a little while doing so. I think this was probably the case, though again it was done in a half hearted manner. No distinct H.S. was heard at any time until she finally surfaced. I doubt if she used a greater speed than 3 - 4 knots for any movement.

11. Haida reported the sound of tanks being blown once, and after ESKIMO's fourth attack a patch of air bubbles appeared in the middle of the pattern about 1 1/2 minutes after the charges had exploded, and persisted for about 2 minutes. As the range had been opened to 100 yards by this time, accurate observation of the disturbance was not possible.

11. When the U-boat finally surfaced (beam on to ESKIMO) she was almost directly between HAIDA and ESKIMO. ESKIMO had to go full astern to clear the line of fire, and a few rounds (10 S.A.P.) were fired as soon as the range was close. The U-boat obviously had surfaced prepared to abandon ship without delay, and certainly did so with remarkable celerity, all the crew (52) being in the water astern within a minute, thus neatly avoiding the effects of HAIDA's fire. ESKIMO closed to within half a cable ready to board, but before the Whaler had time to reach the submarine she rolled over and sank. A small but definite explosion was felt later, presumably from scuttling charges.

12.The Commanding Officer, Oberlieutenat Zur See Walter Zeplin, 3 Officers and 42 ratings were picked up.They were landed at Falmouth at 0300, June 25th. One rating was severely injured, having been shot (Oerlikon?) through the calf and was given a blood transfusion. (One pint from a German volunteer and 3 of plasma). Without this he would not have survived. One other rating had a severely injured hand, the result of a machine gun bullet from an aircraft attack about 4 or 5 days ago, and there were three other minor injuries.

13. Throughout the hunt anti-Gnat tactics were used, a speed of 7 knots or less being maintained, except when within 700 yards of contact when speed was increased to 200 revs (20 knots) to attack. Firing speed for the recorder was about 15 - 16 knots. Had asdic conditions been less good there can be no doubt that contact would have been lost after attacking, and with the large turning circle of these ships,and the necessary speed restrictions, it might have been difficult to regain contact, especially if the enemy had shown enterprise in anti A/S tactics. As it was contact was not lost for more than short intervals, and there was never much doubt as to the U-Boat's position.

14. ESKIMO was in contact when the U-Boat surfaced, and would have attacked again shortly.

15. The U-Boat could not have known that he was being attacked by two Tribals as he had dived before we were in visibility range. Had she known, it is fair to assume that she would have been more enterprising. Prisoners stated that the 4 bow tubes were loaded, one with a "SOUND" torpedo, but were not fired.

16.I consider that this success would not have been achieved in any but good A/S conditions owing to the A/S limitations of those ships, and regrettably, because of very indifferent operating. Had the U-Boat been resolutely and skilfully handled, again the issue would have been in doubt. And finally, had the U-boat been aggressively minded as well as resolute and skilful, the story might have been very difficult. These large destroyers at 7 knots or less present a simple target, their turning circles are large, their acceleration poor, and their A/S equipment and outfit of depth charges obsolescent.

17. In spite of this success, I am strongly of the opinion that Tribals should not engage in prolonged A/S work. An Escort Group should take over at the first possible opportunity. I think it is reasonable to sit on a contact for a short period, but early relief by the proper A/S ships from Escort Groups is most desirable. Though this success adds to the variety of the 10th Flotilla's bag, and is a feather in our cap, it should not be taken as too strong an encouragement to go after U-boats when so many better equipped vessels are available, though it does show that such good opportunities must be taken without hesitation when they do occur.

18. Weather:-

NOTES:

(1) Transcribed from a copy of an original document by Jerry Proc on Aug 16/94. Any mistakes or typos in the original document have been preserved during the transcription.

(2) If any letters in the original document were illegible, they have been replaced with a question mark.

(3) When comparing ESKIMO's attack report to HAIDA'S attack report, it can be concluded that the Brits used better grammar but the Canuks had a better typewriter :-)