Project Boresight 

Original text By William Reed with W. Craig Reed

Objective - The following account of Project Boresight has been paraphrased by the web master and also shortened considerably from the original account found in a web document at Tripod.com. The intent is to highlight some technical characteristics of Project Boresight and how it affected the Soviet submarine crisis and the  Cuban missile crisis of October 1962.

 In November, 1960, the monitoring station at a USAF base in Karamursel, Turkey started noticing that all HF transmissions from Soviet submarines had ceased.   The primary function at Karamursel was to monitor, by means of massive antenna arrays, any electronic emissions from the Soviet Union as well as any transmissions from Soviet fleet units, surface or subsurface. In spite of searching frequencies used by the submarines for the last 30 years, there was no luck in intercepting any further transmissions. The mystery deepened but all those who were in charge agreed that the Soviet subs had to be communicating with their Fleet H.Q. in some manner.

Historically the subs had always been required to check in at least once daily. If they were in foreign waters that could expand to four times a day.  There were a lot of Russian subs on patrol therefore there should have been an abundance of signals to monitor.

A small corner of the Karamursel station housed an American  Naval Security Group (NSG) detachment. One day, the Chief-in-Charge, William Reed of intercept operations section, theorized that the Soviets might have started to use “burst” transmissions. It was a technique that the Germans started to use towards the end of WWII. Back then Morse Code was compressed and sent out in bursts of a few seconds or less. It was a successful technique which eluded the standard direction finding techniques of the day.  Even by 1960 there was no equipment that could provide a bearing on a burst transmission and even if it was possible, the contents would have been encrypted.

By Christmas 1960, however, the “lost” Soviet submarines had been found and quite by accident. William Reed had been hearing a “scratchy” sound for some time on various monitored circuits, but had passed it over as some kind of an anomaly…. a spurious emission. It sounded like a burst static but not quite. Then, one day, he made a sonograph-enlarged picture of another signal that happened to have one of these scratchy sounds almost on top of it.

Years earlier at Skaggs Island California, NSG was primarily tasked to record and analyze Soviet radio transmissions. Everything was encrypted, so the trick was to break the code in order to read the traffic.  The device used in  the process was a sonograph machine. It utilized a large drum around on which a photographic type of paper was hand wound by the operator for each signal to be analyzed. On playback of a recorded signal, the structure of the signal was imprinted and enlarged for inspection by the analyst.  That work required 20/20 vision and a tremendous amount of patience. Once a signal code was broken, someone  had to figure out from the baud formations their equivalent letters in the Russian Cyrillic alphabet. This initial decode was sent to  the National Security Agency. NSA engineers were then able to construct machines that could read these messages in the same manner as the Soviet machines.

When NSA began to read Soviet traffic in volume, they passed on relevant excerpts to military or political end users. Good information could not be obtained forever as the Soviets changed signal codes frequently.  When the codes changed, it was back to the drawing  board to start all over again.

Reed indicates “It was the sonograph machine that enabled us to locate and analyze the “scratchy” signal.  I spread it out and took a closer look.  I’ll be damned!  It had bauds!  Tiny bauds; the most compressed signal that I had ever encountered.  It was a man-made signal and it obviously was not one of ours.  It was a burst signal, and it had  to be a Russian sub.  It just had to be!

We fired the recording directly to the National Security Agency, and they were ecstatic!  NSA put their best analysts on it and instructed us to concentrate on obtaining as many recordings of this new signal as possible.  And suddenly we (and other Naval Security Group intercept stations) began to find them all over the spectrum.  Scratchy signals were music to our ears ...  now that we knew what to listen for. As we obtained better recordings, I measured them carefully and deduced that the signal had a “trigger” heading, probably meant to activate a Soviet recording device.  The trigger was a series of bauds at 345 characters per second, followed by a series of bauds at 142 cps.  Next came the obvious text of the message. NSA confirmed our suspicions in short order. The subs were back! They had, of course, been there all the time.”

 “We had found the Soviet burst signal, but now the question was, “What can we do about it?”  Even before NSA put their best code experts and computers to work trying to break the text, I knew that it was unbreakable. If we could read the text of a position report, we would obviously know the exact location of the submarine. Our only hope, I realized, was to devise a means to locate the transmitters by direction finders. With existing technology, that was impossible.  A new concept was required.”

The reason why spies get on and off the air as quickly as possible is due  to the time that it takes time to get a bearing on any transmission.  One direction finder will only provide the bearing from which the signal is emanating.  It does not tell the operator how far away the transmitter is.  Three direction finders zeroing in on the signal will give a triangulation, and the approximate location of the transmitter.  A number of direction finders will give a multiangulation and a much closer location of the transmitter. But the typical burst signal was on the air for less than a second. That was okay for the operator at a Soviet receiving station, since his triggering device would automatically turn on his recorder. Once recorded, the operator had all the time in the world to feed the signal into a decoding machine which contained the key  to translate the coded bauds into Cyrillic alphabet and thence to Russian plain language. NSG could (and did) build a triggering device to record the signal, but that left them with nothing more than an unbreakable code.

Since existing direction finders didn't have time to get a live bearing, the only hope was to devise a means of obtaining  a bearing “after the fact” from a recorded signal. That had never been done before and no one in NSG thought it would be possible. But NSA engineers did exactly that. They started a crash program on a par (almost) with the Manhattan Project of WWII ( ie to build an atomic bomb). Within months after intercepting the first Soviet burst signal, NSG  had stations set up and operating to detect, record and direction-find Soviet submarines. At first this was limited to areas of primary strategic importance, but soon expanded to cover every body of water in the world where Soviet subs operated.

In common with most great discoveries, the concept was, in retrospect, basically simple: it consisted of constructing huge circular antenna fields in areas around the world which would be able to receive transmissions from critical bodies of water in which Soviet submarines normally operated. These antennae called Wullenweber arrays were connected to large banks of receivers, tuned to narrow bandwidths which overlapped and covered the entire spectrum that the submarines might conceivably use. When a receiver encountered a trigger on a burst signal, a wide (two inch) sixty-inch-per-second recorder switched on immediately and recorded the signal, along with a marker, indicating the time to the millisecond that the signal was intercepted. Since the antenna field was circular, and divided into segments every few feet, it was also possible to determine, tangentially, the general direction from which that signal had been received.  When combined with two or more other intercepts which provided a triangulation or multiangulation indicating the general direction from which the signal had emanated, one was able to determine, after the fact, the approximate location of the submarine.

Later, NSG had obtained ample space at their site locations to construct separate antenna fields for both intercept stations and direction-finding stations. This allowed the luxury of comparing notes between the two to obtain even more precise evaluations of direction. Ample space on site was a prime consideration since, besides the large antenna fields, the space required for the reception and recording equipment required a large building and had to be fully air conditioned, since the receivers in those days still used vacuum tubes which generated considerable heat. Land area  sufficient for construction of a base, with housing and other facilities for the operational personnel, had to be taken into account. Large power plants and ancillary units had to be installed. The project was immense in scope, and was classified Top Secret. That codeword, which designated the entire program, was BORESIGHT. The BORESIGHT project which has just described is now as outdated as the Model-T Ford. It did however, play a critical role  in the outcome of the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962.

 In 1961, BORESIGHT was in its evolutionary stage. NSG had to train operators at outlying stations on what to look for, and how to analyze the signals when they received them. No one could mail them a correspondence course and  of course, nothing could be described by telephone or over the radio. The tapes containing examples of burst signals had to be hand carried. That meant by armed courier, with the tape in a briefcase attached to his wrist by lock and chain. In other words, that meant people like Reed and others who knew the signal first hand would have to train operators in the field. During the next period,  Reed circled the globe many times helping to install BORESIGHT stations and training personnel. In early 1962, Reed was notified that he had been selected for a commission in the United States Navy.

National Security Agency, Fort Meade, Maryland 1962-1965

Upon reporting in at NSA, Reed was assigned a minor desk in Section A22, the Soviet Submarine or, effectively now, the BORESIGHT section. As the only man in the section with any actual BORESIGHT field operational experience, he encountered a great deal of confusion and misunderstanding about what the equipment could and couldn't do. He brought in other field experienced personnel, and eventually worked them into a competent BORESIGHT Control Headquarters.

In September 1962, American U-2 over-flights finally confirmed what had been suspected: the Soviets were installing missiles in Cuba. That's all the American public ever heard about. It has never been officially acknowledged, but there was also a Russian Submarine Crisis going on simultaneously. Intelligence had received evidence of Soviet submarine pen construction in Cienfuegos, Cuba. Soviet submarines with potential long range missile launching capabilities, stationed that close to U.S. shores, with the resultant increased ability to range up and down US coasts, posed a much greater threat than medium range fixed missiles in Cuba.  That danger had to be eliminated at all costs. NSG were told to maximize efforts to locate the position of every Soviet submarine possible. They did so and started to get hit after hit.

In late October 1962, NSG obtained BORESIGHT fixes, and later visual sightings, of four Soviet Foxtrot-class attack boats converging on Cuba.  It was suspected more were on  the way.  That's when Reed’s boss, Commander McPherson, who was Chief of Section A22 (Soviet Submarine Section) at the NSA, was called to the White House. The president and his inner circle had previously been briefed on BORESIGHT, but in light of these new developments they wanted an up-to-date confirmation of just how good it was and a technical explanation of precisely how it worked. Should the U.S. decide to blockade Cuba, a Wolf Pack of near-silent Foxtrot submarines carrying nuclear-tipped torpedoes could spell disaster unless the US could find them.

Commander McPherson was a sharp, competent, naval officer, but he only knew BORESIGHT second hand, mostly from Reed. In fact, both men had worked up his presentation jointly. Operationally he was on solid ground, but he was a bit intimidated by some of the technical aspects. As a result he invited Reed to accompany him to the President's office. The briefing was actually held in the "little" White House, or annex, off to the right side of the White House proper.

Commander McPherson gave a very good presentation, but as the briefing progressed and the questions became more technical and precise, Reed was called upon frequently to amplify. He had brought along charts and graphs which had been previously prepared for use in a BORESIGHT manual. Most of the questions came from the panel of technical experts assembled from various agencies of the Defense Department.

President Kennedy asked very few questions. He appeared to be very  tired. Secretary of Defense Robert  McNamara,  seemed to be pretty much in charge ... at least at the beginning of the briefing. But as the briefing progressed  he looked like he was falling asleep; head down, almost on his chest. When the presentation concluded, McNamara's head came up. The first question (or rather review) came from him. He said, "Now let me see if I understand this ..."  and proceeded with the most precise and comprehensive explanation of BORESIGHT that Reed ever heard. He had memorized just about everything that NSG had presented in a two-hour briefing.  He had the ability to make even bauds and bits and radio-wave-propagation theory sound interesting.

There was a key question which had to be answered and everyone wanted the President Kennedy to understand. What did a BORESIGHT position report translate to in terms of precise target location?  Was it 100 yards, or 500 yards, or five miles?  It could mean a big difference to  ASW weapons.  If this came down to a shooting war, could the US take out one or two of the subs moving in Cuban waters, or all of them, if needed, with one concentrated strike?

The main point made during the presentation was  the limited number of BORESIGHT stations installed and operating. NSG would be lucky to get a simple triangulation fix. That would put any fix in the right ballpark, but it would not guarantee the precise location of the target.  Once in the ballpark, it was up to naval forces to locate the target. Given more locations, a multiangulation fix could be provided, thus improving the accuracy of the initial fix.

The Cuban Missile Crisis:

William Reed and his son also compiled a precise day-to-day account of U.S. Naval operations during the Cuban Missile Crisis, including the vital role that BORESIGHT played in bringing that operation to a successful conclusion. In the details of those day-to-day operations of the U.S. Naval ASW forces, they pointed out time and again how the ships of the US ASW forces were directed to the precise locations of various Soviet submarines. The subs had made the mistake of raising their antennae and sending off position reports by burst transmission but BORESIGHT nailed them.

There was no militant exchange involving Soviet submarines, because by this time Khrushchev was having second thoughts. His Fleet Commander, Admiral Gorshkov, continued to assure him that the Foxtrots, operating on battery power, were invisible.  They could not be detected by the Americans!  But Khrushchev was receiving reports hourly from his submarine commanders contradicting this assurance. His “invisible” Foxtrots were being prosecuted around the clock by U.S ASW forces to the point that they were often forced to surface under threat of depth-charge attack. Khrushchev began to realize that he could no longer back up his threat to "sink the American naval vessels" should they try to effect a quarantine of Cuba. On the contrary, his Foxtrots were in imminent danger of being sunk! The deciding factor in this exchange was, of course, BORESIGHT.

At 10:30 AM on October 27, 1962, Secretary of State Dean Rusk turned to McNamara and spoke words that would make history,  "We're eyeball to eyeball and I think the other fellow just blinked."  All Soviet ships headed toward the quarantine line had stopped or turned toward the Soviet Union.  The Essex received her next orders: do not fire, allow the Soviet ships every opportunity to turn around!

So what made Khrushchev blink? Volumes have been written trying to answer that question.. Khrushchev was finally convinced that Kennedy was serious about going to war over Cuba and that was the most plausible reason as to why he backed down.  Khruschev risked loosing everything in Cuba plus a nuclear strike on his own country. (Comprehensive accounts of the Cuban missile crises can be found by Googling that subject).

Following the Cuban Missile Crisis, BORESIGHT quickly became the hottest program at the National Security Agency. It had the full backing of SECDEF McNamara. He insisted upon a crash program. America wanted to install BORESIGHT in every corner of the globe! He pressed American allies for the use of choice locations in which to install the large antenna fields required, plus a secure operating environment.

The remainder of 1962 and all of 1963 was a period of system refinement and expansion. Major installations included:  Adak, Alaska;  Kamiseya, Japan;  Guam;  Pearl Harbor;  Port Lyautey, North Africa;  Edzell, Scotland;  Cheltenham, England;  Recife, Brazil;  Winter Harbor, Maine.  These were backed up by a number of secondary sites which were constantly expanding. In Canada, by 1970, Wullenweber systems (AN/FRD-10) became operational at Masset, BC. and Gander, Nfld. The AN/FRD-13 Pusher system, the smaller version of the FRD-10, was installed in Alert, Nunavut; Inuvik, NWT; Leitrim Ontario and Bermuda in 1979.

By 1964, BORESIGHT had been designated the number two U.S. military priority, second only to the development of U.S. Polaris ballistic-missile nuclear submarines. It remained so closely guarded a secret for the next twenty years or so, that nobody ever questioned publicly what effect this program might have had in the crucial final-day talks between President Kennedy and Soviet Premier Khrushchev. How could they have?  If there had been so much as a rumor of BORESIGHT, the NSA, the CIA, and even the President of the United States would have sworn under oath that no such program had ever existed.

Canadian SIGINT personnel also played a role in the Cuban Missile crisis and the Soviet submarine crisis. This extract from the book "History of Canadian Signals Intelligence and Direction Finding" provides some details.

"One of the prime reasons Khrushchev was ready to capitulate to Kennedy was based on the successes of the Atlantic HFDF Net, specifically with a project known as BORESIGHT, especially the wideband capabilities of these sites. In the exchanges between Krushchev and Kennedy, Khrushchev threatened Kennedy with the information that the Soviets had nuclear submarines sitting on the bottom of the Atlantic from Florida to Halifax. These were armed with nuclear missiles targeted against major and critical sites such as Norfolk, Boston, Cape Canaveral, New York and Halifax amongst others.

Because the Soviets had been using super burst transmissions, they were obviously convinced that those transmissions could not be DF'd or fixed. Kennedy had been well briefed and was prepared for just such an eventuality and was willing, under these severe circumstances, to take the chance of blowing the cover of wideband direction finding successes. He advised Khrushchev that he was well aware of the disposition of Soviet submarines and then proceeded to provide him where they were located by latitude and longitude. He also advised him how often they reported and that they were all targeted with US Polaris missiles. Kennedy also indicated his military were quite aware of the location of the five diesel electric Foxtrot submarines en route to Cuba and the Cuban submarine facility under construction at Cienfuegos, Cuba. He further informed Khrushchev, that in an instant of time, the first target of US forces would be the destruction of the Soviet submarines, both nuclear and diesel electric. The complete scenario then changed and Khrushchev backed down and commenced to negotiate a deal on the de-installation of US missiles in Turkey.

The Supplementary Radio System (SRS), as it was known at that time, and especially its Atlantic DF/lntercept stations located at Gloucester, Ont, Frobisher Bay, NWT, Coverdale, NB  and Gander, Nfld. can take well deserved credit in the contribution they made in support of Kennedy's stance. Canadians can always be proud of our SRS operators for their contribution to this major event in history. They never received so much as a congratulatory message from their Canadian military masters. Recognition did however, come from such US Naval authorities as CNO, CINCLANT and CINCPAC."
 
 

WHY THIS STORY WAS PULLED OFF THE WEB
http://www.amazon.com/review/R33RVKQB7NRWGS

4 of 5 people found the following review helpful
 Red November - belongs in the fiction category, September 11, 2012
By Ex-NSGAThis review is from: Red November: Inside the Secret U.S.-Soviet Submarine War (Audible Audio Edition)
A noted NSGA/NCVA historian, when reading the Internet manuscript of William Reed, then
the book by his son.....replied with a single word when asked about the exploits
of William Reed........HOGWASH! Typical sugar-coating and diplomacy, by a former
high ranking officer.

William Reed, nor Karamursel, were ever involved with the discovery
of the 'sub burst signal;' and he certainly had nothing to do with the analysis of the signal.
The two individuals who accomplished those deeds, were both awarded the Navy Commendation Medal.

Those individuals who were engaged in the original search, and those who became instrumental in
getting the project(s) off the ground ('58-'65); were known as the Clarinet Bullseye task unit, and were awarded
the Navy Unit Commendation, for their participation. Boresight, which Reed mentions repeatedly; came to an end, when the GRD6 sites received the sub systems associated with Boresight (60-61), and attention turned to the sub systems for the FRD10 (Bullseye).

Reed also claims to have been instrumental, in 1961-1962, of traveling the world to oversee the construction of the Navy FRD10 (CDAA) system, and associated sub-systems. The Navy let the contract for the construction of multiple FRD10's, in late 1959; at least a year before Reed claims he 'found the burst signal,' and two-years before
his claim that McNamara approved a 'crash program,' to place CDAA's worldwide. The first operational Navy FRD10 (Hanza, Okinawa), went online in late 1962. The first Bullseye sub system was installed in late '62, and became operational in early '63.

Reed at least got one thing correct. This was a highly compartmentalized project, from day one, and Reed's statement that he went aboard a Turkish submarine ('62), to test sensitive equipment; is absurd. In 1962, the Navy was moving 'sensitive equipment' and tasks out of Karamursel, to Bremerhaven, Germany; as the Turkish Government was demanding 'total access' to the Navy operating spaces. The Navy was in the process of withdrawing both coverage, equipment and personnel, from Karamursel.

There are some additional 'fictional exploits' told by William Reed in his original Internet manuscript (circa 2001), that have been woven into Reed Jr's book.

I won't comment on the exploits of Reed Jr; as I'm not a submariner. I'll leave the task of determining whether his exploits are fact or fiction to those who have served on, and are more familiar with submarines and submarine duty.

But I can echo the statement of the NSGA historian, when it comes to the 'claimed exploits' of William Reed. HOGWASH!
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Edited: 12/08/12

The recently released book by Ted Widmer/Caroline Kennedy (Listening In), contains the transcripts of recorded meetings in the Oval
Office during the Cuban Missile Crisis. There is no mention of a William Reed, attending any of the meetings, nor a transcript showing
that he ever briefed JFK. Maybe the CD's (included with the book) will reveal additional information, but I seriously doubt it.
More evidence that this book is based more on fiction, than fact! Help other customers find the most helpful reviews
Was this review helpful to you?   Report abuse | Permalink

 Red November: Inside the Secret U.S.-Soviet Submarine War B003KQMFHW W. Craig Reed Blackstone Audio, Inc. Red November: Inside the Secret U.S.-Soviet Submarine War Books Red November - belongs in the fiction category A noted NSGA/NCVA historian, when reading the Internet manuscript of William Reed, then
the book by his son.....replied with a single word when asked about the exploits
of William Reed........HOGWASH! Typical sugar-coating and diplomacy, by a former
high ranking officer.

William Reed, nor Karamursel, were ever involved with the discovery
of the 'sub burst signal;' and he certainly had nothing to do with the analysis of the signal.
The two individuals who accomplished those deeds, were both awarded the Navy Commendation Medal.

Those individuals who were engaged in the original search, and those who became instrumental in
getting the project(s) off the ground ('58-'65); were known as the Clarinet Bullseye task unit, and were awarded
the Navy Unit Commendation, for their participation. Boresight, which Reed mentions repeatedly; came to an end, when the GRD6 sites received the sub systems associated with Boresight (60-61), and attention turned to the sub systems for the FRD10 (Bullseye).

Reed also claims to have been instrumental, in 1961-1962, of traveling the world to oversee the construction of the Navy FRD10 (CDAA) system, and associated sub-systems. The Navy let the contract for the construction of multiple FRD10's, in late 1959; at least a year before Reed claims he 'found the burst signal,' and two-years before
his claim that McNamara approved a 'crash program,' to place CDAA's worldwide. The first operational Navy FRD10 (Hanza, Okinawa), went online in late 1962. The first Bullseye sub system was installed in late '62, and became operational in early '63.

Reed at least got one thing correct. This was a highly compartmentalized project, from day one, and Reed's statement that he went aboard a Turkish submarine ('62), to test sensitive equipment; is absurd. In 1962, the Navy was moving 'sensitive equipment' and tasks out of Karamursel, to Bremerhaven, Germany; as the Turkish Government was demanding 'total access' to the Navy operating spaces. The Navy was in the process of withdrawing both coverage, equipment and personnel, from Karamursel.

There are some additional 'fictional exploits' told by William Reed in his original Internet manuscript (circa 2001), that have been woven into Reed Jr's book.

I won't comment on the exploits of Reed Jr; as I'm not a submariner. I'll leave the task of determining whether his exploits are fact or fiction to those who have served on, and are more familiar with submarines and submarine duty.

But I can echo the statement of the NSGA historian, when it comes to the 'claimed exploits' of William Reed. HOGWASH!
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Edited: 12/08/12

The recently released book by Ted Widmer/Caroline Kennedy (Listening In), contains the transcripts of recorded meetings in the Oval
Office during the Cuban Missile Crisis. There is no mention of a William Reed, attending any of the meetings, nor a transcript showing
that he ever briefed JFK. Maybe the CD's (included with the book) will reveal additional information, but I seriously doubt it.
More evidence that this book is based more on fiction, than fact! Ex-NSGA September 11, 2012
Overall: 5
 
 

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Sort: Oldest first | Newest first Showing 1-9 of 9 posts in this discussion
Initial post: Apr 22, 2013 8:22:55 AM PDT
Last edited by the author on Apr 22, 2013 8:25:46 AM PDT
W. Craig Reed says:
 

While I commend Ex-NSGA for his service, I must take exception to his comments regarding the validity of William J. Reed's service. As outlined in the Notes section of Red November, dozens of former NSGA and NSA operators and directors were interviewed for this book, many who worked at Karamursel with my father on the Boresight program, and several who heard about my father during their involvement in Boresight/Bullseye, including a former program director. As Ex-NSGA should know, Boresight and Bullseye were separate but related programs. Boresight dealt with the "after the fact" direction finding equipment installed at FRD-10 and GRD-6 stations. Boresight eventually did come to an end, but not until the mid-sixties, after my father left the program.
As for my father's participation in the program, I have dozens of copies of his original orders, performance evaluations and awards, one received directly from Lt Gen. Gordon Blake for service related to the Boresight program. Here are a few excerpts:
16 JUN 61: TULOG DETACHMENT 28 (located at Karamursel, Turkey): Subject: Letter of Commendation from F.V. Mason (Boresight station commander): "During the period of 25 December 1960 - 1 March 1961 you were assigned duties in connection with the BORESIGHT project at this station. As the immediate supervisor of the operation of this equipment you were directly responsible for the rapid training of the personnel involved and for the effective use of the equipment (and so on...)."
4 JAN 62: "...report to U.S. Naval Communication Station, Washington, Cheltenham, Maryland, for temporary additional duty..."
7 MAR 62: TDY to Istanbul, Turkey (to test sensitive equipment aboard the Turkish submarine located there). "You are cleared for access to classified material including TOP SECRET CRYPTO."
14 NOV 63: "You are directed to proceed from Fort George G. Meade, Maryland to England and other NATO countries on TDY on official business for the Department of Defense..."
24 JUL 64: "You are directed to proceed from Fort George G. Maryland to Calif., Alaska, Japan, Guam and Hawaii (FRD-10 station locations) on TDY..."
29 June 64: (TDY to five Boresight station locations)
Fitness Report 3-1-64 to 8-31-64 signed by Captain Pearson, Chief of an Office of Production of NSA: "Assigned to an element of the NSA, a DoD Joint Activity consisting of members of three Services and civilian personnel (the Clarinet Bullseye task unit). Engaged in a highly specialized field of communications involving research, analysis and reporting."
16 SEP 64: "Assigned to duty involving the tasking and operation of a major weapons support system of vital concern to, and in satisfaction of requirements levied by, Navy operational commanders. LTJG Reed has continued to demonstrate outstanding performance in all areas. He has completed a technical report of major significance which has earned a letter of appreciation for NSA from the Chief of Naval Operations. Additionally, he has undertaken an extensive overseas trip to impart his considerable knowledge to field stations under the operational control of this Agency. His performance has been such that he has been recommended for the Joint Services Commendation Medal."
I could go on, but actual copies of orders, many stating BORESIGHT right in the orders, as well as commendations from senior ranking officials involved in the program, are more than enough proof that my father is not a "liar" as has been intimidated by EX-NSGA.
As for the briefing at the White House with President Kennedy, EX-NSGA is correct, Widmer and Kennedy's book, Listening In, does document "carefully selected" (not all) recordings, but only from the Oval Office and the Cabinet Room. Had EX-NSGA actually read my book, he'd know that the meeting with my father took place in the Fish Room. The book Listening In does not include any recordings made (if any exist) in this room. As noted in my book, several witnesses and one White House entry log validate my father's claim regarding this visit.
EX-NSGA: I respectfully request that you remove your comments regarding my father's service, as these are clearly incorrect and are therefore slanderous. I further caution you to read the excerpt below from a recent Wall Street Journal article. As a former service member, I also ask you to examine your motives and make the right decision here. To dishonor a former naval officer who was decorated and received commendations from high ranking officials for his service is disrespectful and without merit.

William Craig Reed, author of Red November

WSJ Sunday, Kelli B. Grant, "Venting online is a good way to wind up in court."
Business owners haven't been shy about taking legal action against the writers of negative online reviews-in part because the Communications Decency Act prevents them from going after the review site, says David Wachen, an attorney in Washington, D.C., "What you need to be very careful about is, opinion is protected by the First Amendment, but false statements of fact are not." Reviewers should consider their wording carefully before posting, and not assume posting anonymously will provide a shield. "Sometimes people have a false sense of security, if they're sitting in pajamas writing nasty things about people under a pseudonym," Mr. Wachen says. "While it can be challenging, it's not impossible to track you down."
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In reply to an earlier post on Aug 2, 2013 2:16:28 PM PDT
Last edited by the author on Aug 17, 2013 6:20:00 PM PDT
Ex-NSGA says:
Your father did not discover the 'burst' signal, nor did he do the preliminary analysis of the signal. The individual who discovered the signal, and the individual who did the preliminary analysis; were both awarded the Navy
Commendation Medal, and neither were stationed in Karamursel. Both remained in the Navy for over 20-years, one retiring as a CPO, and the other as a full Commander.

Boresight (an NRL project) was in effect, before the subs went silent, and effectively came to a standstill when the subs stopped communicating with morse code, and began using the burst signal. Those individuals who were members of the Clarinet Bullseye Task Unit (R Branch - morse/df types), were awarded the Navy Unit Commendation, and the effective date of the Task Unit (Dec '58), is the date the subs went silent. Fully two-years before your father claims they stopped transmitting morse, and began communicating with the burst signal. Only with the discovery of the burst signal, did the non-morse personnel (R Branch at that time), become involved with the project, and they were also awarded a Navy Unit Commendation.

You make an outrageous claim in your book that your father was an 'R' Branch CPO, operating as an 'O' (Operations Branch) CPO; therefore he was in charge of OPERATIONS. As anyone who was a CT can tell you; 'O' Branch CT's were the COMMUNICATIONS BRANCH of the NSG, and had NOTHING to do with intercept operations. At the time Boresight and early in the life of Clarinet Bullseye, only one branch of the CT's (R Branch) was tasked with operations (morse, non-morse, elint, speech/language). T and I Branch did not exist until 1960.

BTW, for some additional information that needs to be corrected. The Soviets did not construct their first KRUG at Khabarovsk (pp46). The first KRUG's (4) were initially installed in the Moscow area, and they constructed a total of 31 KRUG's. Many of these sites were in existence before the first US site (Hanza, Okinawa FRD-10) became active in October 1962).

And as for the 'complex processes,' 'deductions,' 'and heavy doses of transmission analysis,' to determine when Soviet missiles might be launched, as well as the type and probable destination' (pp26). Poppycock!

In the book, you credit an 'R' Brancher onboard the USS Oxford with hearing the sounds of a 'Soviet radar, codename Whiff' (pp61). The elint
equipment, operated by T Branch personnel, was located in the T Branch spaces.

There are other glaring errors in the book, that are too numerous to enumerate.
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In reply to an earlier post on Aug 2, 2013 4:41:35 PM PDT
W. Craig Reed says:
Ex-NSGA, if one is to assume that all of your claims are correct, then one must assume that all of my sources are incorrect, including a former director of both programs. While there may have been others who separately also discovered the burst signal, the official navy documents I referred to previously validate that Boresight did indeed remain as a program well into the early 1960s and my father played a crucial role. You claim that my claims are "outrageous," yet offer no references or sources to support your suppositions. On the contrary, my book offers dozens of pages of references, sources, notes, and interview validations. I refer you to the Naval Research Laboratory 75th Anniversary Awards for Innovation document, specifically page 36, wherein three individuals were recognized for the Boresight program: R.D. Misner, M.J. Sheets, and B. Wald, all noted in my book. Two of them received awards as stated in this document: "Project Boresight's crucial contribution to national defense was recognized by the awarding of the Distinguished Civilian Service Award to NRL's R.D. Misner and M.J. Sheets."

It appears you have some confusion about the timing of the Boresight and Bulls Eye programs and who was involved. The NRL document clearly states the following for Boresight:
"The first of three innovations that underlay this work was retrospective direction finding.
Previously, all stations in an HFDF network were required to measure characteristics of the
same signal while transmission was still occurring; after-the-fact measurements were needed.
Previous attempts at NRL and elsewhere were limited by storage bandwidth and recorder
instabilities. Recording significant fractions of the HF spectrum and using a digital method
for overcoming recorder instabilities enabled retrospective DF. This was the basis of the
1960 quick-reaction Project Boresight that deployed the AN/FLR-7 and AN/FRA-44
worldwide."

Note the start date of 1960 for Boresight. The 1958 project you refer to is actually Bulls Eye, a separate and at that time not yet related program. The date was 1957, not 1958, as validated by this excerpt from the same (and other) NRL document(s): "In the1950s, NRL constructed a 400-ft diameter electronically steerable array and perfected the underlying technology." The NRL document references the two individuals primarily responsible and further notes the timing as 1957: "Gleason, R.F. and Greene, R.M., "A Wide-Aperture HF Direction-Finder," NRL Memorandum Report 746, October 1957."

In short, the peanut butter development started before the chocolate and the two came together in the early 1960s. Ex-NSGA, you are clearly passionate about this topic and appear to be quite certain of your facts (even thought they contradict NRL and other published documents and dozens of interviews with experts). If you truly believe you are correct in all of your assumptions, I strongly recommend that you write your own book, get it published, and set the record straight. Otherwise, what exactly are trying to accomplish by posting comments that lack any credibility or valid sourcing?
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In reply to an earlier post on Aug 4, 2013 10:15:51 AM PDT
Last edited by the author on Aug 15, 2013 6:53:38 PM PDT
Ex-NSGA says:
Here is the 'outrageous' claim I placed in my response to you.

<<You make an outrageous claim in your book that your father was an 'R' Branch CPO, operating as an 'O' (Operations Branch) CPO; therefore he was in charge of OPERATIONS. As anyone who was a CT can tell you; 'O' Branch CT's were the COMMUNICATIONS BRANCH of the NSG, and had NOTHING to do with intercept operations. At the time Boresight and early in the life of Clarinet Bullseye, only one branch of the CT's (R Branch) was tasked with operations (morse, non-morse, elint, speech/language). T and I Branch did not exist until 1960. >>

There is nothing outrageous about this statment, it is a statment of 'fact.' The O Branch of the Communications Technician rating, was the Communications Branch of the NSG, not the Operations Branch, as you claim in your book. Nor did O Branchers assume the duties of 'site logistics and operations,' as you claim. If your father was filling an 'O Branch' billet, as claimed, he would have been in the communications center of the NSG operations, sending and receiving messages, setting up the various communications circuits used by that facility, and ensuring the security of the various crypto systems entrusted to the communications branch, etc.

The old job description for Communications Technician O Branch was once available on the Internet, but has since been replaced with the job description (updated) for the Cryptologic Technician rating, which replaced the old Comm Tech rating. Here is a link to that job description.

http://usmilitary.about.com/od/enlistedjob1/a/cto.htm

In another segment of your book (pp23), you infer that your father was in charge of DF operations, and working in the Air Force df shack with other Navy personnel; which was a seperate facility from the main operations building at Karamursel.

So, which is it???

Was your father the Ops Chief, sitting in the office with the Operations Officer?? Where he would have been if he had been Ops Chief?

Or was he working in an O Branch billet, in the communications center?

Or was he in the DF Shack, spinning the dials of a df receiver and providing bearings (highly unlikely for a Branch CPO)?

BTW, according to two former Karamursel R-Branchers ('58-'61), one of whom worked DF, Karamursel was not part of the Navy's Atlantic DF net, as you claim in your book (pp29), and provided only line bearings to the morse and non-morse sections of NSG operations in the ops building. Communication between the two buildings was via telephone, using one-time pad to encrypt the frequency and transmission type, and the return bearing was also encrypted using a one-time pad. BTW, if Karamursel had been a member of the Atlantic df net, it would have communicated with Cheltenham, Md; not Northwest, Virginia. Northwest did not become net control until 1963/1964 when the FRD10 became operational.

You may also want to refer to an NRL news item titled: 'A Tribute to the Father of Electronic Warfare (Howard Lorenzen), easily found on the Internet. Allow me to post a very short quote from this article.
" Boresight successor Bullseye's "... So let me repeat; First there was Boresight, then there was Bullseye, then there was Classic Bullseye....until the project became obsolete. And all three coverwords were classified, and would not have been used in the open. Clarinet Bullseye, was the task unit for the personnel who worked the special project from the time the morse signal was lost ('58), the discovery of the burst signal ('59), the operation of the initial Boresight installations ('60) the operation of the first Bullseye installations (62), through 1965; when Classic Bullseye began.

When you update your book, I suggest your start on page 3, with the following statement:

"The Soviet city of Vladisvostok had a population of almost a half million Russians in the early fifties.
---snip-- "Vlad" served as a staging area for an extensive segment of the Red Bear's Eastern Fleet, including ballistic missile submarines." Ballistic Missile Submarines, in the early fifties?? (I believe someone else also pointed this out in their review). And you might want to do a little research on 'Vlad,' as it was the Fleet Headquarters of the Soviet PACIFIC FLEET.

You may also want to do a little more research on the Soviet Whiff radar (pp61) and the reported panic it raised (according to the undocumented verbage that follows the discovery by an R Brancher onboard the Oxford), when detected on August 17, 1962. Whiff was (by 1962) an outdated and inferior fire control radar associated with Soviet AA sites, and has absolutely nothing to do with the construction of the ICBM site. Especially when this site was located in the Havana area, and numerous intercepts of a Fire Can radar (also associated with AA sites) had already been intercepted in the Havana area and other parts of Cuba. This was a 'ho-hum' event, and treated by NSA in that manner.

http://www.nsa.gov/public_info/_files/cuban_missile_crisis/17_august_whiff.pdf

I'm not about to write a book, nor engaged in a contest to see who can pee up the wall the furthest. But I am interested in accuracy in a book that is being sold to the public as the history of a project I am familiar with, and see so many inconsistancies and fabrications (like the scene in DC upon the discovery of the Whiff radar signal, which was actually treated by the NSA as 'no big deal,' as most can see from the NSA documents I linked to).

I can cite other factually incorrect statements in the book, but it would be a waste of time, based on the comments you've made to other reviewers who were also critical of the liberties you've taken with the facts.
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In reply to an earlier post on Aug 31, 2013 8:55:05 AM PDT
Last edited by the author on Aug 31, 2013 9:42:42 AM PDT
Ex-NSGA says:
This response has to be broken into FOUR (4) parts.

PART ONE

The first part of this response, will address the comments of the Author in items posted 04/22 and 08/02 - 2013.

The 2nd part will outline the discrepancies between the Internet manuscript (circa 2001) by
William and W Craig Reed, and the book. A copy of this manuscript can be found at the following URL:

http://dool-1.tripod.com/days79.htm

The 3rd part will outline the inaccurate statements found in the book, Red November, Chapters 3-5. I've included a few examples from Chapters 6 thru 11; but it would be overkill to attempt to include every error found in the first 11 chapters of this book.

REED: As outlined in the Notes section of Red November, dozens of former NSGA and NSA operators and directors were interviewed for this book, many who worked at Karamursel with my father on the Boresight program, and several who heard about my father during their involvement in Boresight/Bullseye, including a former program director.

RESPONSE 1: (Re: dozens of former NSGA) I found exactly 4 former NSGA personnel listed, and one of them is the Author's father. One of the others was not at Karamursel with the Author's father, and is deceased.

Another individual had just entered the Navy when Boresight/Bullseye was getting off the ground, and recently told one of my sources that he had never worked with the Author's father, nor can he remember every being interviewed by the Author or his father, nor did he work for the NSA following his retirement. He also said he would never have revealed any info directly to the Author, since the Author was never cleared to received such info. He does not know why he is listed in this book as an information source.

The 4th individual, you list as a CTMC, when in fact, he was a CTM3, and states that the Author wanted to speak to his father (Edward, a CTMC) who had worked extensively on the systems the Author was interested in. My source indicates the email exchanged with the individual, gave the Author very little, if any, information about the sub-systems, and was confined to basic information on how the FRD10 antenna system operated. This information can be found on several web sites.

RESPONSE 2: One other reference the Author supplied, an referred to as the Boresight/Bullseye and FRD10 'contracting engineer,' who provided information in regard to the Author's father (Chapters 3-11), did not enter the Navy until the mid-70's; well after the Boresight/Bullseye programs were initiated, and almost 10-years after the Author's father left the Navy.

Another individual the Author reference as a major contributor, had a single telephone conversation with the Author, and he sent a copy of a book he co-authored, which had nothing to do with the Author's father. He never met the Author's father, nor worked with the Author's father, and never provided the Author with information on Boresight or Bullseye.

I'm still looking in the references for the 'former Program Director;' the Author referred to.

RESPONSE 3: Of the two maintenance personnel; who were trusted companions of the Author's father (as stated in the book), the Author is not even certain of their first names, or how to spell their last names. Highly unlikely, if they spent as much time with the Author's father as portrayed in the book. And it's obvious: if the Author didn't know their names, then he certainly didn't interview them. So where did all the dialog come from?

RESPONSE 4: There was never a Boresight program at Karamursel, while the Author's father was stationed there, nor was it ever intended for Karamursel to be a Boresight station. It lacked two essentials for inclusion in this program.
It had no Navy GRD6 df system installed, and it was not part of the Navy Atlantic df net. Therefore, it would have never have had any of the Boresight sub systems installed. BTW, these sub systems were delivered to the GRD6 sites beginning in 1960. Prior to that, the only Boresight station (experimental) was the NRL GRD6 located at the Hybla Valley Coast Guard Station in Virginia.

Karamursel did have a Soviet submarine fleet mission, which was carried out by the R Branch (manual Morse) section stationed at Karumursel, until December of 1958, when the Soviet submarines ceased transmitting via Morse code, and went to another form of communication (burst transmission). A special project was initiated at Karamursel, and other stations having sub coverage, and this project was manned by the personnel of the Clarinet Bullseye Task Unit.

REED: As Ex-NSGA should know, Boresight and Bullseye were separate but related programs. Boresight dealt with the "after the fact" direction finding equipment installed at FRD-10 and GRD-6 stations. Boresight eventually did come to an end, but not until the mid-sixties, after my father left the program.

RESPONSE: Boresight equipment was never installed in the FRD10. Boresight sub systems are specifically for the GRD6 df system.

Both Boresight and Bullseye were NRL projects to develop the concept and equipment to deal with short duration signals emanating from Soviet submarines (initially Morse, until 1958, then the burst signal, after 1959).

The Boresight sub systems (FLR7 and FRA44) were developed at the NRL's GRD6 df site at Hybla Valley, Virginia, and was specifically designed for the GRD6 df system. Development of the first Boresight sub system began well before 1960. Delivery of both sub systems began in 1960, and were completed by late 1961. No Boresight sub systems were installed in the Navy FRD10 CDAA.

The NRL also had an experimental CDAA installed at Hybla Valley, adjacent to the GRD6. (Both abandoned sites are visible on Google Earth - 4/1998 imagery). This CDAA was used to develop the two FRD10 sub systems (FLR11 and FRA54) under Project Bullseye. Installation of these Bullseye sub systems began in late `62/early '63, when the first system was installed at Hanza, Okinawa.

REED: 16 JUN 61: TULOG DETACHMENT 28 (located at Karamursel, Turkey): Subject: Letter of Commendation from F.V. Mason (Boresight station commander): "During the period of 25 December 1960 - 1 March 1961 you were assigned duties in connection with the BORESIGHT project at this station. As the immediate supervisor of the operation of this equipment you were directly responsible for the rapid training of the personnel involved and for the effective use of the equipment (and so on...)."

RESPONSE: Let me repeat this again. Karamursel was never a Boresight station, as no Boresight equipment was ever installed at Karamursel. In addition, Karamursel was never a part of the Navy Atlantic df Net, as you claim in your book. The Codeword Boresight (classified), would never have been used in an unclassified letter of commendation, while the project was still active, and the codeword classified.

Karamursel did have an unnamed project between Dec '58 and the end of '59, and personnel assigned to this project were part of the Clarinet Bullseye Task Unit. One of my contemporaries received his Navy Unit Commendation and citation for his participation in this project, at Karamursel. His duty assignments after Karamursel, where not associated with the task unit, and he eventually left the SecGru when he was accepted for Navy flight training as a Naval Flight Officer. His CT training at both March AFB and NSA Fort Meade, helped him make the transition from a CT to an NFO (back seat driver and weapons officer), seamless. During his career, one of his assignments was as the CO of a Navy VQ (Fleet Air Recon) Squadron.
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In reply to an earlier post on Aug 31, 2013 9:08:02 AM PDT
Ex-NSGA says:
PART TWO

REED: 4 JAN 62: "...report to U.S. Naval Communication Station, Washington, Cheltenham, Maryland, for temporary additional duty..."

Long before Jan 1962; the Boresight equipment had already been installed at Cheltenham, and was operational. This site was not selected for the construction of an FRD10 CDAA, and remained operational using the GRD6. The personnel who operated this Boresight equipment, were part of the Clarinet Bullseye Task Unit.

Cheltenham, like most of the other sites, also had multiple SecGru functions, in addition to the df, with it's Boresight equipment. A set of TAD orders to Cheltenham, was not uncommon, and is meaningless.

REED: 7 MAR 62: TDY to Istanbul, Turkey (to test sensitive equipment aboard the Turkish submarine located there). "You are cleared for access to classified material including TOP SECRET CRYPTO."

RESPONSE: TUSLOG Det 12 was located at Istanbul, Turkey. It is listed in the NSG history of former sites as having an Elint function, and the only df function that it performed would have been in conjunction with the Elint mission, well out of the HF transmission range of the Soviet submarine burst signal. The station was located in a perfect position to observe Soviet warships and submarines, negotiating the Strait of Bosporus (also known as the Istanbul Strait), on their exit from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean, and their return. These surface vessels were also photographed, as were the Soviet submarines, that were required to negotiate this body of water, on the surface. In addition, They also had some ancillary functions; none of them dealing with Turkish submarines.

The United States would NEVER have put highly classified and sensitive equipment aboard any Turkish submarine. In fact; the US Navy was in the process of moving sensitive equipment and the associated coverage,out of Karamursel, to another SecGru site. This movement began in early 1962, when the equipment, along with the operators, and the mission arrived at this SecGru site.

REED: 14 NOV 63: "You are directed to proceed from Fort George G. Meade, Maryland to England and other NATO countries on TDY on official business for the Department of Defense..."

RESPONSE: There was never a Boresight or Bullseye station located in England. Spain, where the FRD10 was being installed, was not a member of NATO, until 1982. Italy, where the FLR9 was installed, did not have a Navy detachment there until 1964. The only other NATO country that was affiliated with either Boresight/Bullseye, was our neighbor to the north. This entry is more 'fluff,' than substance.

REED: 24 JUL 64: "You are directed to proceed from Fort George G. Maryland to Calif., Alaska, Japan, Guam and Hawaii (FRD-10 station locations) on TDY..."

RESPONSE: There was never an FRD10 installed by the Navy, in Japan. Kami Seya still had the GRD6 (Boresight station), until that facility was closed and they moved to the FLR9 at Misawa ('71). Okinawa was the closest FRD10, and that island did not revert to Japan until 1971.

REED: 29 June 64: (TDY to five Boresight station locations)

RESPONSE: List the Boresight locations that he went TDY to. (If you can!)

REED: Fitness Report 3-1-64 to 8-31-64 signed by Captain Pearson, Chief of an Office of Production of NSA: "Assigned to an element of the NSA, a DoD Joint Activity consisting of members of three Services and civilian personnel (the Clarinet Bullseye task unit). Engaged in a highly specialized field of communications involving research, analysis and reporting."

RESPONSE 1: The Clarinet Bullseye Task Unit never contained members of the Army or Air Force. The Navy operating spaces at San Vito, Clark, and other AF sites where operations were carried out; were off limits to AF personnel. Throughout the manuscript, and the book, you never once mention or provide evidence that your father was a member of the Clarinet Bullseye Task Unit. Most members of this unit, still have the original documentation they received, when presented the Navy Unit Commendation.

REPSONSE 2: In both the manuscript and book, you and your father indicate he remained a member of A22 (headed up by Cmdr McPhearson or Cmdr Kaye, ((take your choice)): yet you offer a fitrep signed by a Capt. Pearson, who reportedly headed up an NSA group, that you fail to mention that your father was assigned to. So Mr. Reed, was he assigned to A22; whose head would have submitted the fitrep?? Or was he in another group at NSA, that had nothing to do with either Boresight/Bullseye???

REED: As for the briefing at the White House with President Kennedy, EX-NSGA is correct, Widmer and Kennedy's book, Listening In, does document "carefully selected" (not all) recordings, but only from the Oval Office and the Cabinet Room. Had EX-NSGA actually read my book, he'd know that the meeting with my father took place in the Fish Room. The book Listening In does not include any recordings made (if any exist) in this room. As noted in my book, several witnesses and one White House entry log validate my father's claim regarding this visit.

RESPONSE: In your father's manuscript, (I downloaded it and have been comparing it to
comments and statements in your book), your father claims he; `was assigned to A22, the Soviet sub, or effectively BORESIGHT section." He claims the head of this section was Commander McPherson; who was his boss. He also claims that he was escorted to the White House by Commander McPherson in October 1962, to brief President
Kennedy. This briefing took place, according to your father, in the White House Annex, a building to the right of the main White House.

However, in your book (pp78), you claim your father was posted to A22, the Soviet SIGINT A Group, headed up by Commander Jack Kaye. And later in the book (pp 134-136) you claim that Commander Kaye escorted your father to the White House; where he briefed President Kennedy. In the book, you claim the meeting took place in the Fish Room, which is adjacent to the Oval Office.

So, Mr. Reed, who was your father's boss; Cmdr McPhearson, or Cmdr Kaye?? And where did the meeting take place; in the WH Annex, (across the street from the WH, not next to it), or the Fish Room? And, where are the fitresp signed by Cmdr. McPhearson/Cmdr. Kaye??

In your exchanges with another critic of your book (Dobbs), when he challenged about the fact that your father's name did not appear on the White House logs, you provided a circular excuse for the fact that your father was not on the logs, and failed to provide the name of the party leader he may have accompanied. The manuscript gives one name (McPherson), and the book gives another name (Kaye). If Mr. Dobbs could not fine your father's name, I'm fairly certain he also looked for Commander Jack Kaye's name on the White House logs. We appear to have a conflict between your father's manuscript, and your book. And as Mr. Dobbs has pointed out, the book itself is full of contradictions, and statements that are misleading, or false.

A highly decorated Navy Commander, who spent a significant number of years at Boresight and Bullseye sites, as well as tours in the DC area; said that the head of A2 (Asst . NavSecGru, Fort Meade ((and the boss of A22)). would have been a full Captain, and he would have been the leader of any party that was called to brief the WH, not
the head of A22, a subordinate unit.
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In reply to an earlier post on Aug 31, 2013 9:13:39 AM PDT
Last edited by the author on Aug 31, 2013 10:00:24 AM PDT
Ex-NSGA says:
PART THREE

ADDITIONAL COMMENTS: In your Father's manuscript (which also carriers your name): allow me to quote his comments.

"Following the Cuban Missile Crisis (1962), Boresight quickly became the hottest program at the National Security Agency. We had the full backing of SECDEF McNamara. He insisted upon a crash program. We were to install BORESIGHT in every corner of the Globe! He pressed our allies for the use of choice locations in which to install the large antenna fields required, and in which also a a secure environment obtained. Security was paramount. The remainder on 1962 and all of 1963 was a period of system refinement and expansion. Major installations included; Adak, Alaska' Kami seya, Japan; Guam' Pearl Harbor; Port Lyaute, North Africa; Edzell, Scotland; Cheltenham, England; Recife, Brazil;; Winter Harbor, Maine. These were backed up by a number of secondaries."

1. The contract for a worldwide network of FRD10's, including Adak, Hawaii, Edzell, Guam and Winter Harbor, was awarded by the Navy to ITT Federal services to deploy these systems, in 1959. Also included in this contract was Hanza, Okinawa, as well as other sites. This was well before (3-years) your father claims that SECDEF Mcnamara insisted on a crash program to build these sites. Bullseye sub-systems were installed in all of them, beginning in late `62/early `63. As with the FRD10, Hanza was the first site to go operational with a BULLSEYE sub system.

2. There was never an FRD10 constructed at Kami Seya, Japan. This site had an existing GRD6, and BORESIGHT equipment was installed at this site in 1960. It continued to operate the GRD6 until the site was closed and operations were moved to the FLR9 at Misawa.

3. There was never an FRD10 constructed at Port Lyaute, French Morocco. This base was closed in 1953, and operations moved to Sidi Yahia, French Morocco. A GRD6 was installed at this site, and it continued to use this system, with the BORESIGHT equipment, until it was closed in 1976. The Rota, Spain NSG site, which opened in 1963, with an FRD10 system, and the BULLSEYE sub systems, assumed most of the coverage assigned to Sidi Yahia.

4. There never was a GRD6 or FRD10 constructed at Pearl Harbor. Both systems were located at Wahiawa.

5. Cheltenham, England never had a GRD6, or an FRD10 installed, and was never a part of the Navy's Atlantic DF Net.

6. Recife, Brazil was a WWII DF site that was decommissioned in 1956.

MANUSCRIPT: In the manuscript, and in the book, there are references in regard to your father being a CTC (E-7), when arriving at Karamursel in late 1959. In the book (pp40), when you father arrives at the NSA in 1961, you refer to him as Master Chief Reed (E-9).

RESPONSE: It would have been impossible for your father to have been
promoted from E-7 to E-9 in a two-years span, unless he was selected under a special program that took place when the E8 and E9 pay grades were established. Your father did not appear on any of the promotion lists for 1959 or 1960. BTW, he was not on the initial list of promotions to E8 and E9, for the 1958 promotion year, the first year of promotions to these pay grades, so his pay grade in 1959, as well as 1961, had to be E-7. A fact that you seemed to overlook, when you promoted him to Master Chief(E9), in your book.

MANUSCRIPT: In the manuscript: "But back in 1961 we were in the experimental stage regarding Boresight,' --snip-- During the next few yeas I circled the globe many times helping to install Boresight stations.

RESPONSE: By 1961, all of the Boresight sub-systems were installed at the GRD6 sites, and all the operators had been trained in the operation of these sub-systems, and any analytical techniques required. Emphasis had shifted to developing the Bullseye sub-systems for the FRD10, which were being installed world-wide. Once the Bullseye sub-systems began arriving at the Bullseye sites, in-house training took place, before the site became
operational. The Navy was also conducting training (schools) for the operation of the sub systems.

BOOK (pp3) The information regarding Vladivostok being the Fleet Headquarters of the PACIFIC FLEET, and not a 'gathering point' for the EASTEN FLEET, including Ballistic Missile Submarines in the early 1950's, has already been shown to be non-factual.

MANUSCRIPT: "It was Mason (Cdr later Capt) who arranged for my transfer to Skaggs Island Communications Station outside Napa, California , following Guam, for a specialized training and then to Turkey, to coincide with his takeover there.

BOOK (pp22): (From Guam) "William J Reed received orders to report to the Naval Security Group at Fort George G Meade, Maryland, for a top-secret assignment briefing. (Prior to transfer to Turkey).

RESPONSE: Another contradiction between what appeared in the Internet manuscript, and the book.

BOOK: (pp28), you claim, "Net Control resided in Northwest, Virginia"

RESPONSE: In the time frame you are discussing (your father's time in Karamursel), the net control function for the Navy's Atlantic df Net, was located at Cheltenham, Md. The net control function did not shift to Northwest, Virginia, until that FRD10 became operational `63/'64.

BOOK: (pp29), I've already debunked the assertion that the CT O Branch was the 'Operations Branch,' and your father, (R Branch) assumed an O Branch billet, because it was the Operations Branch and responsible for site logistics and operations, and he was the 'Operations Chief.'

BOOK: (pp30) "One fateful morning in December 1960, the HF airwaves went silent."

RESPONSE: One morning in December 1958, the Soviet submarines ceased transmitting their daily reports, using manual Morse, on the known submarine frequencies. The rest of the HF airwaves, remained active.

BOOK: (pp46) "The Red Bear's Defense Ministry soon erected its first Wullenweber site at Khabarovsk Krai under the code name Krug, which means 'circle' in Russia. --snip-- The Soviets built nineteen more sites throughout the 50's -snip-"

RESPONSE: The first Soviet KRUG was installed north of Moscow, and was subordinate to the Ministry of State Security (KGB), not the Defense Ministry. This was followed by the construction of 3 additional Moscow KRUG sites. By the early 60's, the Soviets had constructed a total of 31 KRUG sites throughout the Soviet Union, including 3 in the Khabarovsk area.

BOOK: (pp47) "Based on lessons learned from the Bondeville experimental array in 1959, the Air Force awarded a contract to GT&K Sylvania Electronics Systems to build a larger Wullenweber elephant cage-the AN/FLR-9"

RESPONSE: Based on lessons learned from the Bondeville experimental array in 1959, (a Navy funded project) the Navy awarded a contract to ITT Federal Systems to deploy a WORLD-WIDE NETWORK of FRD10 hf/df systems. The first FRD10 to become operational was the Hanza, OKINAWA site, in October 1962.

BOOK: (pp49) "In early 1962, Reed returned to Turkey. Within hours of his return, he jetted to the Karamursel base to integrate the new Boresight technology into the existing df system.'

RESPONSE: This is utter nonsense. The Karamursel df system was run by the Air Force, and was not a Navy GRD6 system, and not compatible with the Boresight sub systems. In addition, Karamursel was not then, and never was a part of the US Navy's Atlantic df network.

BOOK: (PP61-62) 'On August 17, 1962, on board the spy ship USS Oxford (AG-159), an R-Brancher heard something strange, not too unlike the faint sound of tires screeching in a parking lot. Instantly, he recognized the electronic chirp of a Soviet radar code-named Whiff. The R-Brancher informed the officer in charge, and the OIC radioed Net Control, which sent a CRITIC(critical) message to the National Security Agency. Russian speaking I-Branchers assigned to the A Group Soviet signals intelligence desk at NSA headquarters in Maryland ran down hallways and out doors. Within minutes they reported to the office of the operations chief, Major General John Davis. Most were ordered to assist the B Group Spanish linguists listening to intercepted traffic coming from Cuba. --snip-- While Russian-speaking I-Branchers at NSA strapped on head phones and listened, officials hurried to meetings . CIA director John McCone insisted that the detection of the Whiff radar signals and other collected data supported only one conclusion; the Soviets were installing offensive ballistic missiles in Cuba, possibly even nuclear."

RESPONSE: The Elint position aboard the USS Oxford was located in the T-Branch operation spaces, and would have been operated by T-Branch personnel, not an R-Brancher. The Whiff was a WWII vintage Soviet radar system associated with their AA sites, and would not have warranted a CRITIC message from anyone. Most of the AA systems already detected in Cuba where using the newer Fire Can radar system. The Oxford had
no reason to be in contact with any Net Control, as the Oxford had the means of establishing direct contact with the NSA. This particular Whiff antenna was located in the Havana area, and not in the area where the missile sites were under construction. The Whiff radar signal was not associated with 'offensive ballistic missile sites.' The rest of the statements about the panic at NSA, especially the I-Branchers running around in a panic, and strapping on headsets to copy Russian voice signals from Fort Meade, is window dressing and hyperbole.

BOOK: (pp63) Re: Spoon Rest Radar - "Other R-Branchers located at a Huff Duff high-frequency direction-finding station in Homestead, Florida, and on board the spy ship USS Oxford operating in Cuban Waters also heard the signals and multiangulated(?) the source.

RESPONSE: The Homestead site would not have been able to take a Hf bearing on 'the signals' (Spoon Rest), because Spoon Rest operates out of the frequency range capability of Homestead. The Oxford, with it's installed Elint equipment could have taken a line bearing, relative to the position of the ship, but would have been unable to 'triangulate a position.

BOOK: (pp77) "Each boat carried a special OSNAZ group --snip--"

RESPONSE: Any special unit aboard a Soviet Navy submarine would have been a SPETSNAZ unit (military special forces unit) controlled by the GRU (main intelligence directorate), not an OSNAZ group; which was a special political unit, controlled by the NKVD/KGB.
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In reply to an earlier post on Aug 31, 2013 9:14:37 AM PDT
Ex-NSGA says:
PART FOUR

There are six more chapters of the book (6-11) with additional errors that could easily fill another 5-6 pages as part of this rebuttal. I've included a few examples from Chapters 6 thru 11.

BOOK: (Chapt 6 - pp87) (1962) - "To that end, they reviewed which stations had received the Boresight system upgrades and the operational status of each. Only a half-dozen contained the equipment, and none were fully operational. Most still used the old GRD-6 antenna arrays, which meant their ability to locate and accurately pinpoint Soviet submarines locations were shaky at best. Only Edzell, Scotland, in the Atlantic, along with Hanza, Japan, and Skaggs Island, California, in the Pacific were equipped with Boresight and the new Wullenweber elephant cages.

RESPONSE: By 1962, all GRD6 stations operating the Boresight sub-systems, were up and running. The only operational FRD10 was located at Hanza, OKINAWA, and it's BULLSEYE sub-systems were not operational. Neither Skaggs Island or Edzell, had operational FRD10's, nor any of the Bullseye sub-systems operational in 1962. The first operational Bullseye sub system was located at Hanza, Okinawa, and became operational in early 1963.

BOOK: (Chapt 7 - pp101) (On board the USS Oxford) "Once certain of the signal's characteristics, they check what they'd found against the NSA's super-classified TEXTA (Technical Extracts of Traffic Analysis) manual to confirm the radar's identity."

RESPONSE: 'Traffic Analysis' - Traffic analysis is the process of intercepting and examining messages in order to deduce information from patterns in communication. It can be performed even when the messages are encrypted and cannot be decrypted. In general, the greater the number of messages observed, or even intercepted and stored, the more can be inferred from the traffic.

Radar systems are not 'communications links' which pass messages, or on which traffic analysis can be performed, and TEXTA CARDS (not manual) would not have been available to 'confirm the radar's identity. ' No knowledgeable CT (R or T Branch), would make a mistake of this magnitude.

BOOK: (Chapt 8 - pp123 )) Re: John Gurley (One of Mr Reed's listed experts) "When he graduated from high school in 1956, Gurley's parents didn't have enough money to send him to college. Finding a job in Dallas during those days was pretty rough, so he enlisted in the navy to avoid becoming a ground pounder in a rice paddy. During boot camp in San Diego, someone noticed his Texas drawl and said he should learn how to communicate better. He took their advice and struck for communications technician. Weeks later they sent him to radioman school in Imperial Beach just south of San Diego. After graduating form radioman school, Gurley received orders to Morocco. He spent an exotic three years in the desert, then would up in the frigid north near Kodiak, Alaska. In between hunting and fishing in heaven's wilderness, Gurley and twenty-six other sailors ran the Huff Duff station there, --snip--"

RESPONSE: 1. In 1956, there were very few 'ground pounders' serving in rice paddies.

2. The Navy selected individuals for assignment to the CT rating, according to the results of testing during Boot Camp. The individual had no decision on which rating he would 'strike for.' He could, when counseled, indicate a preference; but the final decision was made by the Navy.

3 The school in Imperial Beach was the CT Class 'A' school for R and O Branch, not radioman school.

4. According to NSG site history, Kodiak was an active df site during the years 1942-1944.

BOOK: (Chapter Eight - pp124) "We prepared reports to Net Control on a machine that used a punch tape machine. We'd wrap the yellow paper tape around our finger to form a tight ball and shove it in a Coke can. The ribbon came with two carbon copies that made it thick and hard to handle. We shoved the can into a tube that dropped down to the communications center."

RESPONSE: There was never a 3-ply punched paper tape machine, with carbon paper between each tape layer. Each site was equipped with their own TTY (one receive, and one send), for use in receiving tip-offs, and reporting bearings to Net Control.

BOOK: (Chapter 9 - pp146 October 1962) "Reed pulled to a stop in front of the small operations building near a massive elephant cage. Although Skaggs was one of the first stations to receive the new Wullenweber in 1962, most of the kinks were not yet ironed out. Reed had visited the station a couple of times over the past few months with his team to install and launch the Boresight equipment."

RESPONSE: The Skaggs Island FRD10 was not operational in October 1962. The Boresight sub systems was designed for installation in the Navy GRD6 df sites. A sub system for the FRD10 system (Bullseye) was first installed at Hanza, Okinawa in late 1962, and became operational in early 1963.

BOOK: (Chapter 11 - pp192 November 1963) "Reed flew to Norway to assist with the Boresight installation and training for an antenna system located in Vadso."

RESPONS: More nonsense, since Norway was never part of the Atlantic df network, did not have antenna system compatible with the US Navy GRD6 or FRD10, and this equipment or project would never have been shared with the Norwegians.

Given the predilection of young Mr. Reed for using fancy 'buzzwords and phrases' in his book (i.e. huff duff, Red Bear, Ivan's sea monsters, Bullseye and Boresight (to describe everything from soup to nuts), I find it unusual that in the manuscript and the book, he failed to include a really catchy word, that was used to describe the sites selected for the construction of the Navy's FRD10 CDAA. Evidently, he has not discovered this catchy word in all the interviews he reportedly had with those individuals associated with all the projects. I won't bother adding to his lexicon, and allow him to find this new buzz word on his own.

Most Navy personnel, whether they worked in a Boresight or Bullseye facility, hardly used those cover words to describe the nature of their work. Even today, when a discussion involving the nature of their work comes up, almost all still use a very generic term to describe their involvement. I've failed to find a single reference to this generic term in either the manuscript, or the book. If young Mr. Reed had interviewed the number of Navy personnel involved in the operation of Boresight/Bullseye equipment, as he claims, this term would have been repeatedly used by those personnel.

On Aug 2, 2013, Mr. Reed closed his reply with the following: "posting comments that lack any credibility or valid sourcing.' Also: "other published documents and dozens of interviews with experts."

RESPONSE: I suggest Mr. Reed check his own sourcing, as well as the credibility of the numerous statements in the book, which are easily proven to be 'non-factual.'

You provide no 'published documents' to verify the exploits of your father, nor any interviews with 'experts,' who can verify his or your statements. And I can assure you, none of the people you list as references, were at the site where the burst signal was discovered, and where all the analysis took place.
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Posted on Sep 2, 2013 10:47:43 AM PDT
Last edited by the author on Sep 2, 2013 10:50:32 AM PDT
Ret"T-Bird" says:
REED: 7 MAR 62: TDY to Istanbul, Turkey (to test sensitive equipment aboard the Turkish submarine located there). "You are cleared for access to classified material including TOP SECRET CRYPTO."

MY RESPONSE: We would not have put highly classified and sensitive equipment aboard any Turkish submarine. At that time I was in the process of being transferred out of Karamursel along with the sensitive equipment to another SecGru site. Our exodus began in early 1962, when the equipment, along with myself and two others, and the mission departed Karamurse for our new NSGA Site.

Ex-NSGA Stated Correctly:Reed at least got one thing correct. This was a highly compartmentalized project, from day one, and Reed's statement that he went aboard a Turkish submarine ('62), to test sensitive equipment; is absurd. In 1962, the Navy was moving 'sensitive equipment' and tasks out of Karamursel, to Bremerhaven, Germany; as the Turkish Government was demanding 'total access' to the Navy operating spaces. The Navy was in the process of withdrawing both coverage, equipment and personnel, from Karamursel.
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Contributors and References:

1) Boresight by William Reed found at   http://dool-1.tripod.com/days79.htm
2) History of Canadian Signals Intelligence and Direction Finding by George Fraser and Lynn Wortman . Published by Nanlyn (2005.

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