Across Canada, the EH101 project will create 45,000 direct and indirect person-years of employment over 10 years. Canadian companies will supply a minimum of 10% of the EH101 airframe and 83% of the electronics systems for the CF [Canadian Forces] helicopters. All told, the Canadian EH101 will be more than 50% Canadian-made ? and not to be overlooked is the guarantee that 10% of every EH101 sold worldwide will be Canadian-made, ? but perhaps the best part of the deal are the technology transfers to Canadian suppliers!
Kim Campbell, Minister of National Defence, February 1993 [1]

I'll take one piece of paper, I'll take my pen, I will write zero helicopters, Chretien. That will be it, and I will not lose one minute of sleep over it.
Prime Minister, Jean Chretien, 1993 Election Campaign [2]

The procurement of military weapons and equipment in Canada has often been controlled by partisan political considerations — not by military necessity. The Canadian government's dilatory efforts to replace the Sea King, the Canadian anti-submarine warfare (ASW) helicopter, is an exceptional example of the procurement problems that have existed in Canada due to the historical struggle between defence officials and the government. The CH-124A Sea King maritime helicopter was first acquired for the Royal Canadian Navy (RCN) in 1963 and has remained in active service ever since, despite the recommendations of defence experts and military officials. The aircraft have been outdated for over a decade, and the Canadian government's decision to cancel its replacement in 1993 is a clear demonstration that the fundamental needs of the Canadian Forces (CF) are often subordinate to political parrying within the government. One important aspect of this political neglect of the Canadian military's capabilities is that the use of an ASW helicopter aboard destroyers and frigates — not simply aircraft carriers — was a strictly Canadian innovation. And it is presently used internationally by major military powers that have chosen to capitalize, rather than ignore, its potential. Perhaps the greatest hurdle that procurement officials have faced in their attempt to replace the military's shipborne helicopters is the extremely limited defence budget in Canada; however, the case of the Sea King was not based solely on fiscal restraint. The Canadian government knew of the deteriorating capability of the Sea King since the late 1970s and its disregard for expert defence analysis concerning the military's obsolescent equipment not only hindered what the government could reasonably ask of the military — it placed it in danger.

The RCN received its first rotary-wing aircraft, three Bell HTL-4s, in July 1951. By July 1955, the first ASW squadron, HS 50, had been formed. The unit was based in Shearwater, Nova Scotia, and was outfitted with six dipping sonar-equipped HO4S-3 helicopters, which were immediately used for the development of ASW tactics and procedures aboard the light fleet carrier HMCS Magnificent and its successor, HMCS Bonaventure. Although the helicopters gave the RCN a balanced ASW capability and proved that aircraft were competent in an ASW role, Canadian maritime warfare officials wanted to take the concept one step further and place the aircraft aboard a smaller ship deck. After all, Canada only had one carrier, and if the aircraft could be fit to fly from frigates and destroyers, this would vastly increase the capability of the RCN. Indeed, the very idea dates back to a memorandum from 19433. Trials were carried out successfully in 1956 aboard the frigate HMCS Buckingham using the HO4S, which revealed that, although the idea was feasible and a brilliant force-multiplier could effectively be created, there was a need to rapidly secure the helicopter and reposition it on the deck.4

The initial work to test the reliability of attaching a cable to a helicopter and then using it to pull the aircraft down was done by the Canadian VX10 (Experimentation Squadron Ten). Before any design could be initiated, the concept of whether a helicopter could fly safely while being pulled by a tensioned wire had to be proven. Bert Mead remembered:

We had a Directive, which was rather an informal one, and I think that there was a bit of argument in Ottawa or somewhere about this being a stupid idea, because I recall I got a phone call in VX10 asking us to give some ideas on pulling a helicopter down. At any rate I went down to the old parade square down by C Hangar, we got a truck, rigged up a bunch of pulleys and all that sort of garbage and Bill Frayn came down, with an HO4S I believe it was, and we hooked on to him and the idea was to pull him down and see whether he lost control . . . after a couple of times when Bill cut loose because he was losing control, we finally got it down to the point where he could sit there, steady as the devil, and we could pull him down. . . . So this really was the beginning of that whole concept of operations.5

The impetus for the successful creation of a type of cable system for bringing a helicopter down onto the ship was the fact that the RCN was considering the use of the Sikorsky Sea King, arguably the first helicopter designed expressly for naval applications, aboard its frigate/destroyer size warships.

On 20 November 1962, the Canadian Minister of National Defence announced that approval had been given for the commencement of a program to equip the RCN with a new helicopter to help combat the surge in Russian submarine activity. On 24 May 1963, the Sikorsky CHSS-2 Sea King entered service in Canada; forty-one were procured. It had two turbo-shaft engines, but could operate with only one if necessary, possessed all-weather and night operating capability, and it was amphibious. The HO4S had none of these capabilities. The Sea King was also the first helicopter to combine both hunter and killer capabilities: it could detect, identify, track, and destroy aggressor submarines.6

Once the Sea King entered service, it operated from the carrier HMCS Bonaventure. The RCN was originally looking for a helicopter smaller than the Sea King for their other vessels, but none could compete with the CHSS-2. The RCN then decided to try and use the same Sea King model on the smaller ships. Brigadier-General Colin Curleigh, the pilot of the very first Sea King in Canada and Commander of Maritime Air Group from 1986-89, explained how original the idea was at the time:
 

The RN [Royal Navy] initially operated the diminutive Wasp from some of its frigates, while the USN [United States Navy] took the unmanned route with its ill-fated Drone Anti-Submarine Helicopter. . . . the RCN embarked on a much more ambitious approach. . . . The momentous decision to investigate using the large Sea King, which was already being flown off the Bonaventure, quickly followed. Other navies thought we were crazy, and there were moments when we thought they could be right.7

The key for the new advancement, therefore, lay in the success of the Canadian invention of the Helicopter Hauldown and Rapid Securing Device, also known as the Beartrap, which was attached to a cable lowered by the aircraft. Between 1963 and 1966, all seven of the St. Laurent class destroyer-escorts were converted to the helicopter-carrying destroyer (DDH) class. This was done with the addition of a flight deck, hangar and twin funnels. Moreover, the two Annapolis class DDH vessels were commissioned in 1964, and both classes received the Beartrap. Canadian ingenuity influenced international naval doctrine and, as a testament to this, the RN and the USN copied the DDH concept soon after the success of wedding the Sea King to Canadian destroyers.

Even when the HMCS Bonaventure was retired from service by the government of Prime Minister, Pierre Trudeau, in September 1969, the success of the DDH concept continued to prosper. Although the withdrawal of the Bonaventure was perceived by some as a "death blow" to Canadian naval aviation, the savings that resulted made it possible for the RCN to revitalize its surface fleet with, for example, the procurement of the Tribal class destroyers (renamed Iroquois) commissioned in 1972-73. Concomitantly, the Sea King became an invaluable instrument that complemented the destroyer escorts' ASW capability. The navy also commissioned two new Operational Support Ships (AORs), the Protecteur and the Preserver, which were fitted with facilities for helicopter operations and maintenance. Their hangars held up to three Sea Kings8.

By 1985, the replacement of the Sea King was becoming a serious topic. The aircraft, by then called the CH-124A, had been modernized between 1972 and 1977 to improve reliability. A Sea King Improvement Program was carried out, which combined a general refurbishing with the installation of crashworthy fuel cells, rotor-blade de-icing, strengthened crew seats, a radar altimeter warning system, an improved TACAN/DME readout, and Litton Canada AN/APS-503 radar. From 1975 to 1977, the program also added sonobuoy and marker chutes, dipping sonar improvements, and the ability to hover drop torpedoes. Some of these improvements, however, were ineffective while other problems were still ignored. The helicopter, for example, still lacked an appropriate acoustic processor for modern warfare. The simple fact that the Sea King was designed with 1950s technology made the aircraft increasingly inefficient and difficult to maintain.9

One deceptive consolation to the degenerating aircraft was that the 1975 Defence Structure Review foreshadowed relatively large increases in capital spending. But these increases were to be used on other initiatives such as the Leopard main battle tank, the Aurora long-range patrol aircraft, the CF-18A Hornet fighter aircraft and the City class patrol frigates. The fact that funding for a new maritime helicopter was precluded by other important acquisitions by the military was somewhat acceptable in 1985; a modern military needs many weapons at its disposal and it is sometimes necessary to give certain projects priority to create a capability that did not previously exist. And the Sea King capability already existed; it was simply outdated and inadequate for the level of warfare being practiced in the 1980s.

The temporary neglect of what has been deemed a necessary piece of kit for the CF is often unavoidable. The main problem with procurement delays, however, is that the process takes an exceedingly long time from decision to delivery— often over five years — and every year that it is delayed may mean serious problems.10 The Canadian struggle between buying foreign equipment for its specific military requirements and building its own is a historical problem dating back to before the Great War and is beyond the ambit of this study.11 The fact was that the previous Canadian innovations in ASW warfare were being stultified in the RCN because a new helicopter was needed to keep pace with the technological advancements in the field of naval aviation.

After the modest Sea King Improvement Program, it became clear to the Department of National Defence (DND) that continued refurbishing of the aircraft would be too expensive, and the relative lack of speed and endurance, as well as a lack of a digital signal processor, could not be solved with any level of upgrade or retrofit. DND subsequently initiated a Statement of Requirement to the government and the Sea King Replacement Program (SKR) was subsequently initiated in 1977 and the Program Planning Proposal followed in 1979, thereby entering the project into the Departmental Long Term Plan (LTP) Equipment for the first time. By 1985, however, there had been little progress and there were continued requests to complete a procurement contract for new maritime helicopters. One author astutely stated: "Canada, with a defined role that still emphasizes an antisubmarine warfare role, has found herself in an embarassing (sic) position with the aging Sea King. Once on the cutting edge of technology by placing a relatively heavy, ASW helicopter aboard a small warship such as a frigate, the Canadian Navy has seen its leadership eroded and surpassed by successive generations of helicopters in both the USN and RN."12 Another analyst wrote at the time: "It may be, in fact, that there is no practical alternative to the earliest possible replacement of the Sea King fleet."13 During the summer of 1985, the decision was formally made to replace the Sea King and the SKR Project was renamed the New Shipborne Aircraft (NSA) Project.

In April of 1986, DND authorized the issuance of a Solicitation of Interest package for the NSA project to about sixty companies. A small number of companies that could afford the costly process of responding to a Request for Proposal (RFP) — an eleven volume document that outlined what Canada needed in a maritime helicopter — were expected to compete. The three main companies that responded to the RFP were: Sikorsky, with the SH-60 Sea Hawk, which was in the process of forming the backbone of the USN shipborne rotary wing fleet; EHI, formed by Westland and Augusta, with the EH-101, already procured by the RN to replace its Sea Kings; and Aerospatial's SA 332F1 Super Puma. Notwithstanding who the winner would be, the first helicopters were expected to become operational in 1995.14

Even before the competition for the NSA contract began, Canadian companies had been working for two years on individual projects for the possible avionics and systems required for the helicopter. Indeed, one of the objectives of the SKR was to ensure that Canadian industry had the opportunity to participate in the project. As part of the development phase in the early 1980s, therefore, DND and the Canadian Government opted to proceed with research and development investments in Canadian industry, concurrent with advancing the replacement of the Sea King.15 CAE Industries had been awarded a contract for development of an Advanced Integrated Magnetic Anomaly Detection (MAD) system. Honeywell Canada and Canadian Marconi were awarded a contract to develop the Helicopter Integrated Navigational System (HINS). Computing Devices of Canada won a contract for approximately $10 million to develop a Helicopter Acoustic Processing System (HAPS). Lastly, there was a consortium of Computing Devices of Canada, Litton Systems of Canada and Canadian Marconi who were awarded a contract of $32 million to develop a Helicopter Integrated Processing and Display System (HINPADS). In total, nearly $50 million was invested in Canadian industry to facilitate Canadian participation in the implementation of the Sea King replacement.

On 5 August 1986, the Canadian government approved the project definition phase of the NSA, which signaled that it was fully committed to the procurement process.16 The companies, foreign and Canadian alike, were justified in spending their money to try and fulfill the rigorous requirements of the RFP, which included expensive material at the time, such as a Global Positioning System (GPS). On 5 August 1987, Perrin Beatty, the Minister of National Defence, announced that the Canadian government had made a decision. As Sikorsky had already dropped out after acquiring seven percent of Westland, the only real loser was Aerospatial. The EH-101 was chosen because it was a modern helicopter designed for naval specifications and the NSA Project Management Office (PMO) believed that the Super Puma simply could not meet Canada's naval needs, as it was designed as a land support helicopter for the French Army in the 1950s. Although EHI was a consortium of two Italian companies and one from the United Kingdom, because the NSA, like the SKR, required that there be a substantial amount of Canadian technology on board the new helicopter EHI had already made partners with the powerful Canadian companies of Bell Textron, Canadian Marconi, Pramax Electronics and IMP. The Canadian avionics industry was designing some of the most advanced ASW systems available, and EHI had maximized Canadian content in that area, thereby stimulating the developing Canadian aerospace industry. In addition, this meant that the EH-101 would be built for specific Canadian needs. In 1992, a contract was signed jointly with Montreal-based Paramax Systems Ltd. and EHI to supply forty-three new EH-101 model helicopters at a total projected cost of $4.7 billion.

Although all the specifics of the contract were established by 1992 and the order had been made, the NSA program was still not completed and the imminent Canadian federal election threatened to disintegrate the entire venture. Many also felt that Marcel Masse, the new Minister of National Defence, would end the fledgling NSA program due to budgetary cuts. Despite the serious fiscal restraint that followed, the NSA was spared. The thought at the time by defence officials was that it was simply impossible to cut a program that was both necessary and near completion. One analyst opined:

As to the unthinkable alternative of cancelling the NSA program, apart from the loss of money already spent or committed plus cancellation charges, it must be recognized that the new frigates are reckoned to be only about 60 percent effective without helicopters. Apart from this, the NSA is still regarded by DND as a sacrosanct program that it is essential to carry through.17

The program, however, was not deemed as important by the new Canadian government elected in 1993. The domestic political environment was already unstable with Brian Mulroney resigning earlier that year and Kim Campbell, the Minister of National Defence, becoming the Prime Minister. Canadians, dissatisfied with the performance of the economy and the Conservative government's management of the national debt, voted Liberal. The NSA program and the EH-101 contract were immediately cancelled after Jean Chretien and his government took power that year. Chretien had made the EH 101 an election issue and referred to the helicopter as "a Cadillac-type helicopter that is not needed because it is not based on the new reality of the Cold War being over."18 Although Chretien had accused the Conservative government of Brian Mulroney of squandering taxpayers' money, not only did the new Liberal government nullify approximately nine years of work and investment, it also paid an appalling fee of close to half a billion dollars to cancel the contract; specifically, the total costs of termination amounted to $478.3 million, and the subsequent Sea King Life Extension program cost $71.5 million.19

Notwithstanding the cancellation costs, the amount of work in the form of subcontracts that were to be fulfilled in Canada was quite substantial, as well as numerous agreements with EHI to provide parts and systems for the EH-101 global market, which would have provided exceptional stimulation of the Canadian aerospace industry. Canadian industry was guaranteed work for 170 shipsets of the kind of EH-101 parts that they were supplying to the NSA. While over two-thirds of the distribution of economic capability and activity in this aerospace industry was located in the Ontario and Quebec regions, there were a number of large subcontracts outside eastern Canada that would have stimulated economic development across the country. The aircraft engine contract that went to General Electric (GE) Canada, located in British Columbia, for 170 engines (three going to each helicopter) including spares, support, and training was valued at over $108 million. Canadian Aircraft Products (CAP) also of British Columbia won contracts as the prime international supplier of both the forward fuselage and the horizontal stabilizer. Initial orders were valued at over $12 million; however, the potential world market mandate was valued in excess of $75 million and countless years of employment were expected for many provincial residents.20 IMP in Halifax was expected to be responsible for engineering, mission system modifications, support equipment, flight test, and the integrated logistics support, that may have provided approximately $400 million to the company. And EDO Canada in Winnipeg was selected as the prime international supplier of sponsons for the EH-101 with the potential world market valued at over $71 million.21

It would be naive not to acknowledge that the millions of dollars involved in the NSA contracts were in reference to the 'potential' value of international sales and they were inflated simply by the enthusiasm and marketing strategies of the companies involved. Notwithstanding their optimism, if the forecast assessments of these companies were significantly less than imagined, it would still have been a substantial addition to the Canadian Gross Domestic Product. Perhaps equally important would be the improved technological knowledge infused into the Canadian aerospace industry, which would have greatly enhanced the quality of Canadian labour and capital resources. As the NSA Programme Manager Harvey Nielsen stated at the time: "These are high tech jobs — this is the stuff that can be exported out of the country. The fundamental characteristic of the economy is changing. Software and the ability to manufacture data - chips, high-density circuit boards — is what it's all about."22

While it is true that the major sub-threat ended with the end of the Cold War, the Canadian military relied on the Sea Kings for much more than ASW. Secondary roles included search and rescue (SAR), medical evacuation, and vertical replenishment. The year after the Sea King was cancelled, the 1994 Defence White Paper acknowledged that, "there is an urgent need for robust and capable new shipborne helicopters. The Sea Kings are rapidly approaching the end of their operational life. Work will, therefore, begin immediately to identify options and plans to put into service new affordable replacement helicopters by the end of the decade."23 A further study had forcefully explained why the Sea Kings still needed to be replaced:

 Although the submarine threat has greatly diminished with the end of the Cold War, military planners still consider it necessary for Canada's maritime forces to have some ASW capability, if only for the protection of Canadian warships involved in NATO or UN operations. Regardless of any ASW equipment, the helicopter replacing the Sea King would still complement the capabilities of Canadian ships by providing surveillance above and around them, by transporting supplies and personnel, and by carrying out rescue missions when required. Sea Kings were used extensively in the Persian Gulf and the Adriatic Sea, as well as for inspecting cargo ships as part of the enforcement of UN sanctions against Haiti; they were also used to transport supplies for UN peacekeepers in Somalia.24

The cancellation of the NSA program showed a lack of understanding of the military's use of equipment by the Canadian government. The cancellation also demonstrated an ostensible unawareness of the information the military had provided since the 1970s. The Canadian government effectively abandoned a military technology that Canadian industry could take credit for assembling– the Beartrap/Sea King/frigate combination. In the eyes of the defence procurement officials, this was especially unfortunate as the cancellation came in a century where Canada had most often failed in its own military technological innovations.25

In Canada, as in most liberal democratic states, civil control of the military has meant the control of the armed forces by civilians elected to Parliament acting in accordance with statutes passed by that legislative body.26 Civilian control is intended to ensure that the decisions affecting the defence of a nation and the use of the armed forces are taken by politicians that are responsible to the people– not professional soldiers. It could also be argued, however, that the politicians have a responsibility to use the information that they are given by military experts, despite their possible bias, to make informed decisions. One author has stated: "civil control of the military is managed and maintained through the sharing of responsibility for control between civilian leaders and military officers." 27.

Each group, therefore, agrees to assume certain responsibilities and accountabilities within a formalized regime of understandings. This regime should, theoretically, allow each a measure of independence but ultimately, as in the case of Canada, the civilian authority reserves the right to make many of the final decisions - including those that affect weapons procurement.

The Canadian government has historically disregarded many of the military's requests to ensure that it is not unduly subjected to the interference of the armed forces in the administration of the nation - something that has consistently plagued non-democratic states.28 But it is equally true that the civil power had already accepted an active role in the maintenance of international security. There are countless examples of this. In one case in August 1990 after Iraq invaded Kuwait, three naval ships were sent to the Persian Gulf as part of Canada's commitment to a United Nations multi-national force to restore peace. The DDH, HMCS Athabaskan, embarked a two Sea King detachment and the AOR, HMCS Protecteur, embarked a three Sea King detachment, both from Shearwater's HS 423 Squadron. The five Sea Kings were the first Canadian combat aircraft to participate in the Persian Gulf action, dubbed 'Operation Friction'. Operationally, the Sea Kings were tasked to interdict unauthorized merchant vessels in the Gulf, protect the vital logistic sea lines, and search for mines. The Canadian government, therefore, did have a commitment to its military and, as a result, were responsible for the capabilities of the force that it sent. But between 1967 and 1994, seven crew were killed in eleven Sea King crashes. The remaining twenty-nine Sea Kings required extensive maintenance and were prone to breakdowns.29 In order for the Canadian Forces to continue being an effective participant in international security the Canadian government would have been wise to place more confidence in the advice and recommendations of the military about the capability of their maritime helicopters.

It is clear that defence officials were consistently overpowered within the civil-military relationship in Canada regarding the replacement of the Sea King and the procurement of weapons and equipment for its military was controlled by political considerations over the advice of military professionals. As a corollary, the competency, capability, and potential of the Canadian Forces were weakened. The cancellation of the NSA program is a powerful example of the hierarchy between the military and the civil power in Canada with regard to equipment procurement; the contract was subjected to severe political scrutiny and interference outside the Department of National Defence, which effectively negated many of the possible benefits of the project. While there had been much activity and significant effort devoted to replacing the Sea King by defence officials in the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s, they were essentially overruled in one day by their political leaders. Military involvement and contributions to international security had directly affected international influence during this time and, through that, increased national sovereignty and the Canadian quality of life. The Canadian government, therefore, should have given more credence to the fact that, if Canadians wished to enjoy the benefits of collective defence, it should have also participated in the ideal; thereby, allocating adequate finances to its own military for modern equipment purchases. A possible alternative would have been to limit the missions that the government sent the military on and, as a corollary, limited its international influence. The cancellation of the NSA also limited possibilities for the Canadian defence industry and suppressed the DDH idea that it was responsible for. From 1972 to 1993, the Canadian Forces did all within its power to convince the Government of the requirement and urgency to replace the CF's maritime helicopter. But they ultimately failed due to the nature of partisan politics in Canada. The example of the Sea King has highlighted the civil-military conflict in Canada regarding armament procurement and illustrated that national defence contracts are often controlled by political considerations over military requirements.

   1. The Wednesday Report, 24 February 1993, 1.
   2. "Full Circle: Electoral Promise to axe choppers returns to haunt Chretien," taken from the internet in February 2002 (http:www.canoe.ca/CNEWSPolitics/jan5_choppers.html).
   3. Stuart Soward, "Canadian Naval Aviation, 1915-69," in James A. Boutilier, ed. The RCN in Retrospect, 1910-1968 (Vancouver, 1982), 278.
   4. For more on the development of the destroyer/frigate borne helicopter capability see J.D.F. Kealy and E.C. Russell, A History of Canadian Naval Aviation (Ottawa, 1965); and Stuart Soward, Hands to Flying Stations: A Recollective History of Canadian Naval Aviation, II, 1955-1969 (Victoria, 1995). See also Swhawn Cafferky, "Unchartered Waters: The Development of the Helicopter Carrying Destroyer in the Post-War Royal Canadian Navy, 1943-1964," Ph.D. Dissertation, Carleton University, 1996.
   5. This and the rest of the paragraph are based on Peter Charleton, Nobody Told Us It Couldn't Be Done: The Story of the VX10 (Ottawa, 1995), 123-5.
   6. "An Appraisal of the New Helicopter," Crowsnest, vol. 15, no. 1, (January, 1963); and Leo Pettipas, Canadian Naval Aviation, 1945-1968 (published privately, 1990), 149.
   7. This quote and the rest of the paragraph are based on Brigadier General Colin Curleigh, "The New Maritime Helicopter: Reliability Will be Crucial," Canadian Defence Quarterly (Summer, 1997), 26-7; see also "Wedding of the Sea King," Crowsnest, vol. 16, no. 3-4 (March-April, 1964).
   8. Soward, "Canadian Naval Aviation," 283-84; Curleigh, "The New Maritime Helicopter," 27.
   9. This and the following paragraph are based on Martin Shadwick, "Replacing the Sea King: Canada Examines the Need to Replace its Sea Kings with a new ASW helicopter," Canada's Navy (Annual, 1985), 164-5.
  10. For example, the CF-100 Canuck jet-interceptor took far longer than expected - over five years - and missed the world market because of it; it was not ready when the Korean War started and international air forces turned to other aircraft for their needs. See Randall Wakelam, Flights of Fancy: RCAF Fighter Procurement 1945-1954 (Kingston: Masters Thesis, Royal Military College of Canada, 1997).
  11. See William Johnston, "Canadian Defence Industrial Policy and Practice: A History," Canadian Defence Quarterly, 18/6 Special no. 2 (June, 1989); Robert Bothwell, "Defence and Industry in Canada, 1935-1970," in Benjamin Franklin Cooling, ed. War, Business, and World Military-Industrial Complexes (London, 1981); Col. W.N. Nelson, "The Need for a Viable Defence Industrial Base," Canadian Defence Quarterly, 15 (Spring, 1986); David G. Haglund, ed. Canada's Defence Industrial Base: The Political Economy of Preparedness and Procurement (Kingston, 1988).
  12. Thomas Lynch, "Naval Shipborne Aircraft: Rotary Flight After the Sea King," Canada's Navy (Annual 1986), 98.
  13. Martin Shadwick, "Replacing the Sea King: Canada Examines the Need to Replace its Sea Kings with a new ASW helicopter," Canada's Navy (Annual, 1985), 164-5.
  14. Ibid, 99-100.
  15. For an overview of the research and development investments in Canadian industry for this and the following paragraph see Thomas Lynch, "Stuffing NSA: DND and Canadian Industry Gear Up to Provide Comprehensive Mission Suite", Canada's Navy (Annual, 1987-88), 102-104.
  16. This and the rest of the paragraph were retrieved from Thomas Lynch, "New Shipborne Helicopter Program," Canada's Navy (Annual, 1987-88), 98-101 and idem.,"Canada's NSA Program: And Then There was One," Canada's Navy (Annual, 1988-89), 116-17.
  17. David Godfrey, "Procuring Canada's New Helicopters: Still Firmly on the Rails, the Canadian Navy's New Shipborne Aircraft Program has Survived Severs Cutbacks in Defence Spending," Canada's Navy (Annual, 1991-2), 38.
  18. Brian Underhill, "Chretien Downs Helicopters," Halifax Chronicle-Herald, 5 November 1993.
  19. Joseph T. Jockel, The Canadian Forces: Hard Choices, Soft Power (Toronto, 1999), 75
  20. The Wednesday Report, 12 May 1993, 5 and 20 Oct 93, 4.
  21. The Wednesday Report, 21 April 1993, 5. The initial order, valued a $8.9M, called for 100 of the composite landing gear covers with the first 44 going to the UK.
  22. The Wednesday Report, 20 October 1993, 6.
  23. 1994 Defence White Paper, Canada, Department of National Defence (Ottawa: Canada Communication Group, 1994), 46.
  24. Jockel, The Canadian Forces, 75.
  25. See R.G. Haycock, "Early Canadian Weapons Acquisition: "That Damned Ross Rifle," Canadian Defence Quarterly (Winter, 1984-85); among the innumerable books on the Arrow see Grieg Stewart, Shutting Down the National Dream: A.V. Roe and the Tragedy of the Avro Arrow (Toronto, 1988). It must be noted that Canada has also had some successes. For example, the Canadian designed tank turret that was used in the Canadian Ram and the American M-4 Sherman tank - the most widely used tank in the Second World War. See "The Armoured Corps Story," Canadian Forces, Sentinel (June 1966), 32-33.
  26. Retrieved from the official website of the Canadian Department of National Defence, http://www.dnd.ca/somalia/vol1/v1c6e.htm, on 2 April 2002.
  27. Douglas Bland. "A Unified Theory of Civil Military Relations." Armed Forces & Society.
        26, 1 (Fall 1999),9 .
  28. S.E. Finer, The Man of Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics (London, 1988). 5.
  29. Mike Blanchfield, "Sea King crew used cellphone to get help," 29 April 2001, Ottawa Citizen.

Copyright © 2002 Aaron P. Plamondon
All Rights Reserved
 
 

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Credits and References:

1) http://www.noac-national.ca/article/Plamondon/Sea_King_&_Cancellation_of_NSA.html
 

June 27/10